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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 
13874 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E K I N D O F CASE 
This appeal involves the question of validity of 
an alleged oral contract for the construction and in-
stallation of a sewer line by a developer, for the de-
velopment of two subdivisions, with the City of West 
Jordan, a municipality, absent the necessary legal req-
uisites of the Utah statutes. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
This matter came on for trial before the Honor-
able James S. Sawaya, sitting without a jury, wherein 
1 




C I T Y O F W E S T J O R D A N , 
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the lower court found for the plaintiff-respondent in 
that defendant-appellant was liable to the plaintiff in 
the sum of $20,134.35 on the basis of contract. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellant seeks a reversal of the judg-
ment of the lower court. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S * 
On or about August 6, 1970, defendant, municip-
ality, City of West Jordan, a city of third class, ap-
proved two (2) subdivisions namely, Western Hills 1 
and Western Hills 2, on behalf of developer Midwest 
Realty, plaintiff herein (Exhibits 2 and 3, Tr. p. 13, 
line 29 to p. 14 line 16). Said plats showed the land 
comprised of 34 acres, being subdivided into 167 lots, 
varying in size from 6500 square feet to 7500 square 
feet and were properly recorded pursuant to Utah law; 
said 34 acres were purchased for the sum of $72,250.00 
(Exhibit D-5). Upon the sale of the 167 lots plaintiff, 
between the time it purchased the land on April 15, 
1970 (Exhibit D-5) and it ultimately sold the land as 
subdivided lots by about December, 1971, realized a 
minimum net profit of $73,909.95. (Tr. p. 43, lines 12 
to 15). 
* For convenience purposes the parties herein shall be referred 
to as follows: plaintiff for plaintiff-respondent, and defendant 
for defendant-appellant. All references to pages are as to trans-
cript referred to Tr. All exhibit references are in the same num-
erical order as admitted in lower court. 
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There is evidence in the record alluding to the fact 
that the developer was originally approved by the City 
Planning and Zoning Commission for 158 lots and that 
later the City Council approved 167 lots in considera-
tion of the developer's expense in constructing and in-
stalling the main sewer line in question (Exhibit D-22). 
The lots on said subdivisions were improved by 
various owners and each lot was connected for water 
and sewer service beginning with the first connection 
on November 24, 1970, and the last connection being 
made on September 29, 1972 (stipulated facts). 
Beginning with the month of October, 1971, plain-
tiff by and through its authorized representatives de-
manded from the defendant City of West Jordan the 
payment of monies for the construction and installation 
of a main sewer line which connected and serviced the 
two subdivisions (Tr. p. 81, line 16 to p. 82, line 8). 
Plaintiff predicated its demands for payments up-
on an alleged oral agreement between itself and the 
City of West Jordan wherein the city allegedly agreed 
to repay the plaintiff-developer $1.50 per connection 
per month for a period of 7 years, in order to defray 
the cost of construction and installation of the sewer 
main. Said payment was to made upon completion of 
the connection of each lot to the municipal sewer 
system. 
Defendant refused to pay any monies to the plain-
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tiff and has not paid any money to the plaintiff. How-
ever, defendant had asked the plaintiff to increase the 
diameter of the sewer pipe to be installed said size to 
be ten inches (10") instead of the contemplated six 
inches (6"), and pursuant thereto agreed to pay and 
did pay the difference of the cost of the pipe to the 
contractor in the sum of $2,584. 
On November 17, 1970, the City of West Jordan 
entered into its standard agreement with the developer 
relating to construction and installation of the water 
and sewer lines and connections thereto for both sub-
divisions Western Hills No. 1 and No. 2 (Exhibit P -
25, Tr. pp. 86-87). 
During the period between November 24, 1970, 
the date of the first sewer connection, and September 
29, 1972, the date of the last sewer connection, plaintiff 
made repeated demands for payment of the City of 
West Jordan, none of which was honored by the city. 
On March 1, 1973, defendant City of West Jor-
dan sent a letter to plaintiff advising it that the gov-
erning body of the city considered ". . . the payback 
agreement in the amount of $20,134.35, for extension 
of the sewer line . . ." and that the "council voted un-
animously to reject this agreement as presented." (Ex-
hibit P-20, Tr. p. 64.); attached thereto was an agree-
ment prepared by the plaintiff and presented to the 
council earlier the previous month. (Exhibit P-20). 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On or about May 17, 1970, plaintiff filed a Veri-
fied Claim with the City of West Jordan as a condition 
precedent to filing suit pursuant to Utah law. (Ex-
hibit P-21). 
Thereupon on July 13, 1973, plaintiff filed its 
complaint praying for relief upon the alternate theories 
of (a) contract and (b) quantum meruit. 
A trial was held on September 20, 1974, before 
the Honorable James S. Sawaya, sitting without a 
jury. On September 30, 1974, the court rendered its 
memorandum decision and found ". . . that an agree-
ment exists between the parties wherein the defendant 
city agreed to pay back to plaintiff the cost of the sewer 
installation and that plaintiff is entitled to its First 
Cause of Action as prayed." I t is from this decision 
that defendant appeals and seeks a reversal thereof. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
A S S U M I N G A R G U E N D O T H A T A CON-
TRACT E X I S T E D P L A I N T I F F IS B A R R E D 
FROM R E C O V E R Y B E C A U S E I T F A I L E D 
TO OBSERVE T H E S T A T U T O R Y R E Q U I R E -
M E N T S OF T H E S T A T E OF U T A H AS 
T H E Y R E L A T E TO M U N I C I P A L OBLIGA-
TIONS. 
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A. The contract between plaintiff and the muni-
cipal corporation is void ah initio for failure to observe 
the posting and/or publication of notice relating to 
bidding. 
I t is elementary law that a contract can be valid 
as against the municipality only if there is compliance 
with state law governing the subject matter of the 
particular contract. The Utah State Legislature de-
scribed a method of contracting for the specific pur-
pose of constructing public improvements when it en-
acted Section 10-7-20, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
wherein it states inter alia: 
If the estimated cost of the proposed improve-
ment shall exceed the amounts above mentioned, 
[over $8,000.00 for third class cities] the city 
or town shall . . . do so by contract let to the 
lowest responsible bidder after publication of 
notice at least twice in a newspaper of general 
circulation printed and published in such city or 
town at least five days prior to the opening of 
bids; provided, that where no newspaper is 
printed or published therein, such notice shall be 
posted at least five days prior to the opening of 
bids in at least five public places in the city or 
town, the notice so posted for at least three days 
. . . (emphasis added). 
The Utah State Legislature specifically prescribed a 
mode for the municipality to enter into contracts for 
public improvements and an integral part of that meth-
od is the mandatoiy requirement of the publication or 
6 
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posting of notice. Plaintiff has failed to establish in its 
evidence that there was any publication or posting of 
the notice pursuant to the requisites of the statute. The 
record only discloses that three bids were solicited by 
plaintiff and presented to the city engineers but the 
record is absolutely void of any reference or evidence 
that there was compliance with the sine qua non of let-
ting public contracts that of publication or posting of 
notice. 
The question then is what does the word "shall" 
mean as is used in the statute. This court decided the 
same issue in Herr v. Salt Lake County, U 2d , 
525 P2d 728 (1974) wherein it held that the word 
"shall" in a Salt Lake County Ordinance is manda-
tory and not advisory and therefore jurisdictional in 
nature. In analyzing the issue the court said 
The meaning of the word shall is ordinarily 
that of command. It is defined in the American 
Heritage Dictionary as follows: "2 . . . d. Com-
pulsion, with the force of must, in statutes, deeds, 
and other legal documents." The United States 
Supreme Court distinquished between the words 
may and shall in the case of Anderson v. Yung-
kaii, 329 U.S. 482 (1946) as follows: 
The word "shall" is ordinarily "language 
of command." Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 
493. And when the same rule uses both "may" 
and "shall", the normal inference is that each 
is used in its usual sense — the one act being 
permissive, the other mandatory. 
The County Commission did not act within 
7 
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seven days but took eleven days after the hearing 
before it attempted to reverse the Planning 
Commission. Did it thereby lose jurisdiction to 
make its ruling? The trial court thought that 
it did. 
This court had a related problem before it in 
Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 15 Utah 2d 
305, 392 P . 2d (1964). Involved in that case 
was an ordinance of Salt Lake County which 
provided that an aggrieved party might appeal 
from a ruling of the Planning Commission to 
the Board of Adjustment within ninety days 
after the decision. This court held that the 
ninety-day period was jurisdictional, saying: 
. . . The 90-day limitation of Sect. 17-27-16 
is designed to assure speedy appeal to the 
proper tribunal any grievance that a party 
may have who is adversed by a decision of an 
administrative agency. The evident purpose 
of the statute is to assure the expeditious and 
orderly development of a community, etc. . . . 
Again the general rule is 
That if a contract is within the corporate power 
of a municipality but the contract is entered into 
without observing mandatory legal requirements 
specifically regulating the mode by which it is 
to be exercised, there can be no recovery there-
under. If a statute . . . says that certain con-
tracts must be let to the lowest bidder, or that 
they must be made ordinance, or that they must 
be writing, or the like, there is reason therefor 
based on the idea of protecting the taxpayers, 
the inhabitants, and the provisions are manda-
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tory. If the contract is entered into or executed 
in a different manner, the mere fact that the 
municipality has received benefits does not make 
the municipality liableJ either on the theory of 
ratification, estoppel or implied contract . . . 
As examples of invalid contracts upon which no 
recovery has been allowed for the benefits actu-
ally received may be mentioned the following: 
contracts not based on public bidding; contracts 
not in writing; contracts not authorized by ord-
inances or resolution; contracts not authorized 
by yea or nay vote of the council; contracts upon 
which there was no vote of the council, where 
such vote is necessary . . . (citations omitted; 
emphasis supplied) McQuillin, Municipal Corp-
orations Section 29.26. 
The law in this jurisdiction is that if the require-
ments of the statute are not in substance complied with, 
the contract is invalid and cannot be the basis of any 
liability against the municipality even though the muni-
cipality has received any benefit of the contract. Mc-
Quillin, Municipal Corporations, Section 29.41. 
The question of whether or not publication and 
posting of the advertisement asking for bids for con-
struction of public improvements is a necessary pre-
requisite is answered again by section 29.58 of McQuil-
lin Municipal Corporations wherein it states: 
An advertisement for bids must be published in 
the manner and for the time required by law 
. . . ordinarily a legally designated mode of pub-
lication is regarded as the measure of power, and 
9 
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material non observance will invalidate the con-
tract and proceedings thereunder. Therefore, if 
any particular mode of advertising for bids is 
specified that mode must be substantially fol-
lowed. Generally no publication is proper until 
duly ordered, (emphasis added) 
Further, discussing the matter of posting of n o f r ^ 
lating to advertising for bidding either in lieu of, as is 
in this jurisdiction, or concurrent with publication, Mc-
Quillin states in section 29.59 the following: 
If . . . posting notice is required, a failure to 
post the notices invalidates subsequent proceed-
ings, (citation omitted; emphasis supplied). 
The weight of authority is consistent with the analysis 
set forth and it is urged upon this court, consistently 
with its prior decisions, to uphold the validity of the 
requirement of publication and/or posting in examining 
contracts for public improvements. 
Furthermore, the statute states that the "town 
shall do [let the bids] by contract," and the only rea-
sonable interpretation one may place upon that lan-
guage, especially in view of the public policy consider-
ations involved, is that the "contract" must be in 
writing. 
The Utah State Legislature contemplated that the 
contracts let pursuant to Section 10-7-20, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) as amended 1969, should be in writ-
ing if they are for the construction of public improve-
10 
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mnets and if the dollar limitaton ($8,000.00) is met. 
I t is clear that the legislature by enacting the fore-
going section clearly established its intention to allow 
municipalities to enter into contracts for public im-
provements but said contracts must be in writing, and 
therefore, only those contracts which are in writing can 
be valid and enforceable as against the municipality. 
Such a requirement constitutes a mandatory condition 
precedent and noncompliance therewith renders the con-
tract unenforceable. The municipality can make a con-
tract only in the method prescribed by the statute and 
if not so made the contract is invalid and unenforce-
able. 
The requirements as prescribed by the Utah stat-
ute setting forth the mode of contracting, to-wit, the 
contract must be in writing, is considered mandatory 
rather than merely directory and must be observed sub-
stantially. 
In stating the law McQuillin says 
Statutes requiring municipal contracts to be in 
writing usually are construed to be mandatory, 
and a strict compliance therewith is required to 
bind a city. I t has frequently been held that 
performance, or partial performance will not 
cure a failure to execute a written contract in 
accordance with a statutory mandate.' Section 
29.22 (citations omitted). 
In Utah, in McDonald v. Price, 45 U 464, 146 P 
550 (1915) this court stated that the statutory method 
11 
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of disposal of municipal property must be substantially 
followed, or if the method prescribed is not observed 
and followed, or the contract, whatever it may be, is 
invalid. Accord: Collier, Inc. v. Paddock 37 Ariz. 194, 
291 P 1000 (1930); Forrest City v. Or gill, 87 Ark. 389, 
112 SW 891 (1908); Pasadena v. Estrin, 212 Cal. 231, 
298 P 14 (1931); Durango v. Pennington, 8 Colo. 257, 
7 P 14 (1885) and numerous other jurisdictions. 
B. The contract between plaintiff and the muni-
cipal corporation is void because said contract was not 
countersigned by City Recorder. 
In addition Utah Law (Section 10-10-61, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953) requires that a municipal con-
tract in order to be valid must be countersigned by 
the City Recorder and if not so countersigned the con-
tract is void ab initio in view of the mandatory language 
of the statute. Specifically, the Uniform Municipal 
Fiscal Procedures Act relating to the duties of the City 
Recorder with respect to contracts provides as follows: 
He [City Recorder] shall countersign all con-
tracts made on behalf of the city, and every con-
tract made on behalf of the city or to which the 
city is a party shall be void unless signed by the 
recorder . . . (emphasis supplied) Section 10-10-
61, Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
While this court has not ruled upon the application 
of this statute, six other jurisdictions have ruled and 
upheld the proposition that a municipal ^ont^n-t \« ;n. 
12 
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valid if it is not countersigned as provided by state stat-
ute or ordinance. In Council v. City of Dothay, 236 
Ala. 166, 181 So 293 (1938) and in West Virginia Coal 
Co. of Missouri v. City of St. Louis, 324 Mo. 968, 25 
S.W. 2d 466 (1930), the Alabama and Missouri Su-
preme Courts, respectively upheld the rule of law that 
since the signature of the clerk and/or the controller did 
not appear as mandated by law those municipal con-
tracts could not be enforced as against the municipal 
corporations. Other jurisdictions holding similarly are: 
Superior v. Horton, 63 F 357 (7th CCA, 1893) (comp-
troller's countersignature was essential to validity of 
contract) ; Press Pub. Co. v. Pittsburgh, 207 Pa, 623, 
57 A 75, (1904); Ellerbe % Co. v. Hudson, 1 Wis. 2d 
148, 83 N W 2d 700 (1957) (countersignature by 
comptroller is mandatory requirement of statute); 
White Const. Co. v. Beloit, 178 Wis. 335, 190 N W 195 
(1922); Lee v. Racine, 64 Wis. 231, 24 N W 33 (1885) 
(no countersignature of comptroller, contract invalid). 
Again the use of the word "shall" is mandatory 
and according to the Herr case supra the same rationale 
applies and therefore the contract is void. 
C. Assuming arguendo that a contract existed 
plaintiff is barred from recovery because it failed to 
observe the requirements of Sections 63-30-13, and 10-
7-77, Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
Assuming, without admitting, that plaintiff had 
entered into a valid contract with the municipal corp-
13 
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oration, the plaintiff is under a mandatory obligation 
to observe the requirements of Section 63-30-13, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953) wherein it states, inter alia: 
A claim against a political subdivision shall be 
forever barred unless notice thereof is filed with-
in ninety days after the cause of action arises 
. . . (emphasis added) 
This court had an opportunity to decide this ques-
tion in a rather recent case in Baugh v. Logan City, 
27 U 2d 291, 495 P2d 814 (1972) wherein the court 
stated that an action on a contractual obligation is a 
claim permitted under the Governmental Immunity 
Act, but notice of such claim must be filed in accord-
ance with Section 63-30-13, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953). In the Baugh case a claim based on contract 
was made against the City of Logan for the exchange 
of land owned by the plaintiff with land owned by the 
municipal corporation. In upholding the need that a 
claim must be filed with the city the court speaking 
through Chief Justice Callister stated the following: 
"Finally plaintiffs contend that the trial court 
erred in its determination that Section 63-30-13 
applies to a cause of action based on contract. 
Section 63-30-13 provides: 
A claim against a political subdivision shall 
be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed 
within ninety days after the cause of action 
arises,. . . [emphasis added]. 
Section 63-30-2 (5) provides: 
14 
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The word "claim" shall mean any claim 
brought against a governmental entity or em-
ployees as permitted by this act; [emphasis add-
ed]. 
Section 63-30-5 provides: 
Immunity from suit of all government entities 
is waived as to any contractual obligation, [em-
phasis added]. 
Since an action on a contractual obligation is a 
claim permitted under the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, notice of such claim must be 
filed in accordance with Section 63-30-13." 27 
Utah 2d at 295. 
1. This cause of action arose on or about Novem-
ber 24, 1970, or in the alternative on or about Decem-
ber 29,1972. 
The lower court found that the "main sewer line 
was completed in December ,1970, and that houses were 
constructed on the 167 lots so that by December, 1971, 
141 houses [connections] had been completed, con-
nected to the sewer system and were paying monthly 
service charges of $3.50 per month and thereafter the 
remaining 26 lots were completed, connected to the 
system and began paying the monthly service charge 
of $3.50 per month by June 1, 1972." (Findings of 
Fact, paragraph No. 7), and that ". . . the plaintiff on 
May 17, 1973, did file a verified claim with the city 
pursuant to the appropriate statutes." (Findings of 
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Fact, paragraph No. 9). 
Further, according to plaintiff's testimony no pay-
ment was made by the city to the plaintiff during the 
period of December, 1970 to May 17, 1973 inclusive, 
and that no payment was ever made by the city to the 
plaintiff pursuant to the alleged contract. Upon cross-
examination plaintiff's witness Mr. Green testified as 
follows: 
Q. You testified that the subdivisions were com-
pleted ninety-five to ninety-five [sic] per cent 
by October of 1971, is that true? 
A. Yes, this is true. 
Q. Okay. In December — in November of 1971 
did you receive any payment from the city on a 
payback agreement? 
A. No, we didn't. 
Q. In December did you receive any payment? 
A. No. 
Q. In January of '72 did you receive any 
money? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you receive any money from the city on 
a pay-back agreement up until now? 
A. No. We have received nothing. 
(Tr. p. 72, lines 7 to 20). 
Further, the uncontroverted evidence shows that 
the plaintiff did make its first demand for payment 
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under the alleged payback agreement sometime in Oc-
tober, 1971, and many times thereafter as it is shown 
from the following questions and answers: 
Q. (By Mr. Colessides) Did Midwest Realty 
other than the Verified Complaint that was filed 
on May 17, 1973, make a demand upon the City 
of West Jordan for a pay-back ? 
A. Verbally, yes. 
Q. When did they make that? 
A. Several times. On several occasions. 
Q. Would you state the first date they did that? 
A. Boy, I don't recall to be honest with you. 
Q. In October of '71 did you make a demand 
for payment? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You did? In October of'71 you did? 
A. I am not sure if it was exactly October but 
by then we had made demand for payments. 
Q. You made repeated demands for payment? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So can you — that's very important Mr. 
Green. Would you say that in October of '71 
with ninety-one percent of the subdivision com-
pleted you had made demand upon the City for 
payment? 
A. Yes. They should have started—started ap-
proximately sometime around there. After the 
houses had been completed and the connections 
were made, why, the payments should have 
started. (Tr. p. 81, line 16 to p. 82, line 8). 
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Assuming that the demand for payment satisfies 
the statutory requirements of Section 63-30-13, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953) plaintiff's claim must still be 
barred by reason of Section 63-30-15 wherein it states 
that 
If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute 
an action in the district court against the gov-
ernmental entity in those circumstances where 
immunity from suit has been waived as in this 
act provided. Said action must be commenced 
within one year after denial or the denial period 
as specified herein, (emphasis added). 
Further as to what constitutes a denial of a claim by 
a governmental entity the statute states that . . . 
Within ninety days of filing of a claim the gov-
ernmental entity or its insurance carrier shall 
act thereon and notify the claimant in writing 
of its approval or denial. A claim shall be 
deemed to have been denied if at the end of the 
ninety-day period the governmental entity or 
its insurance carrier has failed, to approve or 
deny the claim, (emphasis added) Section 63-
30-i4, Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
From the uncontroverted facts and the admissions of 
the plaintiff as they appear on the record plaintiff 
should have known that its claim was denied when first 
made in October, 1971, or at the latest by the first day 
of February, 1972, and within one (1) year from that 
date, to-wit, February 1, 1973, according to the obliga-
tory language of Section 63-30-15 plaintiff should have 
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had commenced its lawsuit in order to be within the 
statutes of limitation as herein referred to. Instead, 
plaintiff did not institute the proceeding in lower court 
until July 13, 1973, the date of the filing of plaintiff's 
complaint in Third District Court. 
There appears to be no controversy as to when this 
action arose in that, assuming the facts in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, and assuming, but not ad-
mitting, that plaintiff had a valid contract with the 
municipality, plaintiff's obligations had been fulfilled, 
according to its contention, and plaintiff had fully per-
formed its acts by fully constructing the sewer line in 
December, 1970, and the first connection for sewer 
service, which would entitle plaintiff to payment was 
made on November 24, 1970. (Tr. p. 84 line 18 to p. 
85, line 5). At that point in time, defendant-City of 
West Jordan was obligated to pay the plaintiff the 
amount due for the connections made. I t was incum-
bent upon plaintiff when it did not receive the monies 
which it thought it had coming to pursue a course of 
action prescribed by statute to collect the monies. Plain-
tiff did not do that until May 17, 1973, when it first 
filed its verified claim. 
Viewed differently, the last sewer connection was 
made on September 29, 1972. (stipulated facts, Tr. 
P . 84 line 18 to p. 85, line 9 ) ; again, in view of the 
fact that plaintiff had not received any money on the 
alleged payback agreement up until then, it should 
have followed the dictates of Section 63-30-13, Utah 
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Code Annotated (1953) and should have filed its claim 
for payment within ninety days from September 29, 
1972, which would have been, at the latest, the 30th 
day of December, 1973. By failing to file its claim 
within the allotted ninety-day period plaintiff's claim 
" . . . shall be forever barred.. ." 
2. Plaintiff's claim is also barred pursuant to Sec-
tion 10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amend-
ed). 
Plaintiff is not entitled to any recovery on the 
basis and for the reason that it failed to give proper 
notice to defendant, City of West Jordan, pursuant to 
the following statute: 
Every claim, other than claims above mentioned, 
against any city or town must be presented, 
properly itemized or described as to correctness 
by the claimant or his agent, to the governing 
body within one year after the last item of such 
account or claim accrued . . . Section 10-7-77, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
The law is well settled in this jurisdiction that the pres-
entation of a claim to the governing body within the 
time fixed by law is a condition precedent to bringing 
an action against a municipality. Brown v. Salt Lake 
City, 33 U 222, 93 P . 570, (1908); Hurley v. Town of 
Bingham, 63 U 589, 228 P 213 (1924). 
Furthermore, Section 10-7-78, Utah Code Anno-
tated (1953) states that 
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I t shall be a sufficient bar and answer to any 
action or proceeding against a city or town in 
any court for the collection of any claim men-
tioned in Section 10-7-77, that such claims had 
not been presented to the governing body of such 
city or town in the manner and within the time 
specified in section 10-7-77. 
The necessity for presenting verified claims against a 
municipality has already been decided by this court in 
Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v. Salt Lake City, 87 U 
370, 49 P . 2d 405 (1935) wherein this court held that 
an action to recover monies expended to construct a 
bridge which the city had agreed to construct is barred 
and plaintiff is not entitled to recover because of its 
failure to file a claim as required by Section 10-7-78, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953); accord: Hurley v. 
Town of Bingham, supra. Dahl v.. Salt Lake City 45 
U 544, 147 P. 622 (1915) : Nelson v. Logan City, 103 
U 356, 135 P . 2d 259 (1943); Peterson v. Salt Lake 
City, 118 U 231, 221 P 2d 591 (1950). 
In the case at bar plaintiff did not file its verified 
claim until May 17, 1973, two (2) years and seven (7) 
months from the date the last item of such claim accrued 
if one were to consider that plaintiff's claim arose on 
November 24, 1970, the date of first sewer residential 
connection, or at the conclusion of the construction of 
the sewer line by plaintiff which occurred sometime in 
December of 1970. 
Assuming that there was a valid contract between 
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plaintiff and defendant, a fact not admitted herein, the 
record clearly shows that while plaintiff might have had 
a claim against this municipal corporation beginning 
with the month of December, 1970, plaintiff did not 
receive any money from the city despite its "repeated 
demands", and plaintiff failed to present its claim pur-
suant to the dictates of the Utah statute. 
Plaintiff has failed to produce a satisfactory or 
plausible explanation as to why, while it did not re-
ceive any payment from the city despite its "repeated 
demands", it did not undertake to file its claim until 
May 17,1973. 
D. A liability against a municipality can only be 
asserted if there is compliance with Section 10-6-9, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953). 
This plaintiff in this action had sought and asserted 
against the City of West Jordan a liability in the sum 
of $20,134.35. As the record clearly demonstrates this 
is a unilateral act by the plaintiff to impose a financial 
obligation and liability against the defendant on the 
basis of an alleged payback agreement. However, in 
Utah the creation of a liability against a city or a town 
can only be created pursuant to Section 10-6-9 of the 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Therein it states in pert-
inent parts: 
The yeas and nays shall be taken upon the pass-
age of all ordinances and all propositions to 
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create any liability against the city or town . . . 
which shall be entered upon the journal of its 
proceedings . . . (emphasis added). 
This statute uses the mandatory language of "shall be 
taken" and "shall be entered" in order to demonstrate 
the method through which a municipal corporation may 
be held liable financially. Such requirement constitutes 
a mandatory condition precedent, and noncompliance 
therewith renders the contract unenforceable. McQuil-
lin, Municipal Corporation, Section 29.19. In Selby v. 
Winfield, 255 111. App. 67, the Illinois Court held that 
a contract which involves expenditure of public monies 
can only be enforced as against a city if it is authorized 
by recorded yea and nay vote. The weight of authority 
in the majority of the United States jurisdictions is 
that municipal contracts in order to be binding as 
against the city or town must be a corporate action by 
the legislative body duly assembled and must comply 
with the requirements and requisites of the laws of the 
state and the ordinances of the particular city. Outlin-
ing the procedures for municipal improvement con-
tracts, McQuillin states the following: 
Municipal contracts for public improvements 
generally must be entered into in substantial ac-
cordance with statutes and chargers prescribing 
procedures and forms. Illustratively, where a 
contract for engineering services in connection 
with a municipal improvement was not approved 
by ordinance, as required by local law, the en-
gineering firm could not recover against the city 
on the contract or even in quantum meruit. Ac-
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cordingly, a party entering into an improvement 
contract with a municipal corporation should 
exercise scrupulous care that every governing 
statute and charter provision is respected if he 
intends to collect for his labors. Quite generally 
the improvement contract must be made or ap-
proved by the governing body of the municipal-
ity. Again, where there was no resolution of in-
tention signed by three-quarters of the council 
it was held the contractor could not recover 
against the city. In some municipalities certain 
boards and commissions can effectively contract 
for public works without the approval of the 
governing body. Often the municipal contract 
must be signed by a department head or the 
chairman of the board initiating the works con-
tract and where this is disregarded the contract 
is not enforceable against the municipal corpor-
ation. Care must always be taken that the con-
tract with the municipality is entered into by 
parties authorized to bind the city. Statutes and 
charters requiring contractors to furnish bonds 
are mandatory and recovery has been denied 
when this was overlooked. Customarily muni-
cipal improvement contracts must be in writing, 
(citations omitted; emphasis added) McQuillin, 
Municipal Corporation, Section 23.13 
In Utah Section 10-6-5, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) provides that 
• . . the mayor and city council of the third class 
. . . shall be the legislative and governing bodies 
of such cities and towns, and as such shall have, 
exercise and discharge all of the rights, powers, 
privileges and authority conferred by law upon 
their respective cities, towns . . . 
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In the performance of their duties and obligations pur-
suant to the statutory authority granting the same the 
city council must comply with all the necessary requi-
sites of the laws from which the council draws it powers 
and must not deviate from any of the dictates thereof. 
I t is the general rule that the powers delegated to a 
municipal corporation by the legislature of the state are 
vested in the city council or governing body unless ex-
pressly delegated to some other officer or body and 
further member of a municipal council may act only 
as a group, and members cannot bind the municipal 
corporation by acting separately and individually. Mc-
Quillin, Municipal Corporations, Section 27.07 at p.p. 
234-235. 
Plaintiff attempts to establish that a contract was 
entered between itself and the city by Mr. Coates' testi-
mony that he attended, sometime in August, 1970, a 
special city council meeting (Tr. p. 19, lines 1 to 5) 
and that the agreement was reached and made during 
that special meeting. (Tr. p. 20, lines 7 to 18). How-
ever, upon examination of the evidence and the testi-
mony of the city recorder the record discloses of no 
minutes of any special meeting of the City Council dur-
ing that period of time (Tr. p. 109, lines 1 to 24), and 
plaintiff having that burden of proof, failed to produce 
any minutes of the City Council that such meeting took 
place, moreover, that an agreement to pay plaintiff 
back was reached during said meeting. 
I t is elementary law that the city can only enter 
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into agreements during a meeting, regular or special of 
its governing body and that these agreements must be 
recorded in the journal of its proceedings. 
Generally the power to make contracts on be 
half of a municipality rests in the council or 
governing body, or, in case of a county, in the 
board of county commissioners, supervisors, or 
other governing authority of the county, which, 
however, must act at a legal meeting and as a 
board, since the individual members acting sing-
ly have no authority to bind the municipality. 
I t is well settled that the members of a common 
council, board or committee cannot separately 
and individually enter into a contract which will 
bind the municipality, but they must act as a 
body at a regular or special meeting of which 
such notice shall have been given as required by 
law. (Citations omitted; emphasis added) Mc-
Quillin, Section 29.15. 
In the absence of any evidence that such a special 
meeting took place the lower court has erred in its find-
ings that the City Council had met in official meetings 
and approved "by unanimous vote the payback agree-
ment and that such finding is contrary to the evidence 
in the case and contrary to the law in the State of Utah. 
E. The alleged contract violates the Statute of 
Fruads, Section 25-5-4 (1). 
Plaintiff wishes to assert that there is a contract 
between itself and the municipal corporation, totally, 
however disregarding the dictates of Section 25-5-4 (1) 
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Utah Code Annotated (1953) wherein it states that 
In the following cases every agreement shall be 
void unless such agreement, or some note or mem-
orandum, is in writing subscribed by the party 
to be charged therewith: 
1. Every agreement that by its terms is not 
to be performed within one year from the mak-
ing thereof, (emphasis added) 
Plaintiff has failed to produce anv writm^ ™<>+o n-
memorandum signed by any authorized official of the 
city wherein the city had agreed to perform any ob-
ligations thereunder. Plaintiff merely relies on the 
minutes of the city council which upon close examina-
tion do not reveal that any of the terms and conditions 
of the alleged contract were either clear or definite in 
the minds of the councilmen. 
This court in deciding Adams v. Manning, 46 U 
72, 148 P . 465 (1915), adhered to the rule that there 
must be a sufficient memorandum in writing in order 
to take a case out of the Statute of Frauds and further 
in the Baugh case supra, it stated on note 4 quoting 
from Williston on Contracts that "the preparation of 
deeds or giving instruction for preparation will not 
validate the contract, [citation]" 
The lower court erred in finding that "The Pay-
Back Agreement is specifically set forth in writing in 
the various official Minutes of the City Council and 
was approved by unanimous vote of said Council" 
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(Finding No. 11) in that the minutes by themselves 
cannot constitute an agreement under Utah law, nor 
can it be inferred that the minutes are a memorandum 
of the contract itself. In the Baugh case, supra, plain-
tiffs then had relied upon the minutes of the city coun-
cil to satisfy the requirements of the Statutes of 
Frauds. This court however upheld the trial court's 
decision that the minutes were not a sufficient memor-
andum ; the court said: 
They [plaintiffs] further asserted that their con-
tract was removed from the Statute of Frauds 
by part performance. In the alternative they 
claimed that there was a sufficient memorandum 
in writing to satisfy the statute. In response to 
a request for a copy of the written agreement, 
they stated: 
The minutes of the meeting of the Board of 
City Commissioners of Logan City dated May 
27, 1969, contain the following written evidence 
of a contract for exchange of property: 
"A motion by Commissioner Bott and sec-
onded by Commissioner Jacobsen to authorize 
the Mayor to sign a quitclaim deed transferring 
..,.'•• City Property in exchange for an easement of 
13 feet from Fred Baugh for the purpose of con-
structing a sidewalk and widening the street 
between main and first west street. Mr. Baugh 
to remove the Tap Room building at his own ex-
pense and to relocate the canal to the original 
canal bed and also the building of the new side-
walk." 
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Based on the foregoing defendant moved for 
summary judgment. The trial court issued a 
memorandum decision which was incorporated 
into the judgment in favor of defendant. The 
trial court found that the claim was barred by 
the Statute of Fraud, Section 25-5-3, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 (emphasis supplied). 27 U 2d 
291,292-292. 
There is one other case in Utah where this court ruled 
on the question of admissibility of minutes of municipal 
council meetings but that case only involved the nar-
row issue as to whether or not the minutes of the Rich-
field City Council were admissible as evidence and the 
court held that in view of the fact that a statute re-
quired the keeping of the minutes said minutes were 
competent evidence. Richfield Cottonwood Irr. Co. v. 
City of Richfield, 84 U 107, 34 P2d 945 (1934). Other 
than the Baugh and Richfield cases, above, counsel for 
appellant is unaware of any other case where this court 
considered the import of the minutes of a meeting of 
municipal council. 
Ordinarily, oral agreements providing for payment 
of money which are not or cannot be fully performed 
within one year from the making thereof are within 
the Statute of Frauds, 37 CJS 56c. Under the facts 
of the instant case according to the contention of the 
plaintiff the agreement was reached on or about Aug-
ust, 1970, and under plaintiff's understanding of the 
contract the first payment due was on January 1, 
1972 (Finding No. 13). That is clearly a contract 
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which was not to be performed within one year from 
the making and under the terms of the alleged contract 
it was not to be fully performed for 7 years from the 
making thereof. 
There have been cases which held that a verbal 
agreement for the payment of money by annual install-
ments for a fixed period of years is within the statute; 
See: Sturm v. Continental Oil Co., 131 Kan 518, 292 
P 774 (1930). In addition agreements to pay money 
in monthly installments have been held to be within the 
statute; Maglaris v. Claude Neon Federal Co., 101 Ind. 
App. 156, 198 N. E . 462 (1935); Thompson v. Ford, 
145 Ten. 335, 236 S. W. 2 (1921); Vaudreuil Lumber 
Co. v. Colbert, 220 Wis 267, 263 N. W. 637 (1935). 
Also agreements to pay quarterly, Herman v. Gressel, 
266 N Y S 263, 143 Misc. 775 (1933), and agreements 
to pay semi-annually, Williamsburg City F. Ins. v. 
Lichtenstein, 164 N Y S 345, 98 Misc. 342, affirmed 
176 App. Div. 910 (1916), have been held to be within 
the Statute of Frauds. 
The finding of lower court that the minutes of the 
city council is sufficient memoranda to constitute an 
agreement between plaintiff and the municipal corp-
oration is erroneous and cannot be sustained under the 
evidence and in light of the record. All the minutes 
of the council meetings submitted and accepted as evid-
ence amply show that the parties were merely negoti-
ating a payback agreement; from the first day that the 
matter came to the attention of the council until a con-
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tract prepared and proposed by an agent of the plain-
tiff which was not even signed by the plaintiff, the 
parties were talking and negotiating several alternative 
approaches without ever arriving at a meeting of the 
minds as to what an agreement may be. 
In discussing the essential elements in considering 
the validity of a municipaL contract McQuillin on 
Municipal Corporations states the following: 
The doctrine which seems to harmonize with our 
governmental and legal system, which appears to 
be supported by reason, and which, therefore, 
should prevail may be thus stated briefly: If the 
charter or the statute applicable requires certain 
steps to be taken before making a contract, and 
it is mandatory in terms, a contract not mfcide in 
conformity therewith is invalid, and ordinarily 
cannot be ratified, and usually there is no implied 
liability for the reasonable value of the property 
or services of which the municipality has had the 
benefit. These provisions exist to protect the 
citizens and taxpayers of the municipality from 
unjust, ill considered, or extortionate contracts, 
or those showing favoritism, and if the munici-
pality is suffered to disregard them and the other 
contracting party is, nevertheless, permitted to 
recover for the property delivered or the services 
rendered, either on the grounds of ratification, 
estoppel or implied contract, then it follows that 
the statute or charter provision can always be 
evaded and set at naught. Cases holding the 
contrary are usually based on the idea that it is 
unjust for a municipality to receive and accept 
the benefits of a contract and then defend an 
action to recover the contract price or the rea-
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sonable value on the ground that the contract 
was not entered into as provided by statute or 
the charter, but it should be remembered that 
the other contracting party is charged with notice 
of the provisions of the statutes or charter in 
regard to contracting and that the welfare and 
protection of the taxpayers and residents of the 
municipality are of more importance than the 
dispensation of justice to a private party in a 
particular case. (citations omitted) Section 
29.02 p.p. 215-216. 
I t is urged upon this court that the better reason-
ing is that which is promulgated by this emminent auth-
ority on municipal corporations and the said reasoning 
should be followed by this court in the facts of this case. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E L O W E R COURT C O M M I T T E D R E -
V E R S I B L E E R R O R I N A D M I T T I N G ORAL 
T E S T I M O N Y V A R Y I N G T H E T E R M S O F 
T H E W R I T T E N S E W E R E X T E N S I O N CON-
TRACTS. 
Plaintiff and defendant had entered into two agree-
ments regarding the installation of the sewer (and 
water) extension as it relates to the plaintiff's sub-
divisions. Those agreements are represented by Exhibits 
p-25, collectively, containing the total understanding of 
the parties as they relate to the subdivisions Western 
Hills l a n d 2. 
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Defendant's City Recorder testified as to the 
meaning of those agreements and the procedure fol-
lowed by the city with all developers in stating the 
following: 
Q. (By Mr. Colessides) Plaintiffs Exhibit 
25 relating to water and sewer extensions. Does 
that agreement contemplate and include the ex-
tension of the main trunk line? 
A. I t was my understanding that these agree-
ments pertained to the extension of the sewer 
from wherever the City sewer line ended to 
where it would have to serve the various homes 
on the subdivision. 
Q. And is it always — the method of the City 
in working these extension agreements they re-
quire every subdivider to enter into an extension 
agreement to bring in from wherever the City's 
line ends to wherever they want to develop ? 
A. Yes. Not only to subdividers but anyone 
that wants to extend the sewer line to a home. 
(Tr. p. 91 line 30 to p. 91 line 12) 
MR. C O L E S S I D E S : They signed this kind of 
agreement to take it from wherever it is to bring 
it to where they want to take it. 
T H E COURT: Are you going to have her 
testify that is the usual contract? 
MR. C O L E S S I D E S : Yes, that is the way they 
do business in West Jordan. 
T H E COURT: Would that be your testimony? 
T H E W I T N E S S : Yes. 
(Tr. p. 92, line 1 to line 9). 
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A. (By Mr. Colessides) Now, when we refer 
to the extension agreements Mrs. Anderson, 
twenty-five — 
T H E COURT: Twenty-five? I don't have it. 
T H E W I T N E S S : They are right here. 
MR. C O L E S S I D E S : Twenty-five is over 
there. 
Q. (By Mr. Colessides) Is every subdivider 
in the City of West Jordan obligated to sign this 
agreement? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr. p. 121, line 27 to p. 122, line 4). 
Other than the above testimony relating to those 
contracts there is no other evidence in the record, either 
disputing these contracts, contradicting them, or plac-
ing them in issue of fact otherwise. I t is the only 
evidence which the lower court had before it and to 
merely disregard the contracts in the absence of any 
evidence which might sustain the plaintiff's position 
is reversible error. 
The court compounded its error by admitting oral 
evidence relating to a perfectly unambiguous contract 
in that it admitted into evidence the testimony by Mr. 
Coates and Mr. Green in violation of the "parol evid-
ence rule" despite the timely objection by the defend-
ant. (Tr. p. 16, line 24 to p. 17, line 16.) 
Furthermore, in view of the lower counrt's find-
ings it appears that the motion by defendant's counsel 
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to strike all oral testimony varying the terms of the 
written contract which was taken under advisement by 
the court (Tr. p. 87, line 23 to p. 90, line 18) was denied, 
otherwise, the court could not have reached the find-
ings that it made. 
The lower court's findings No. 5 is totally incon-
sistent and contrary to the evidence in that the Novem-
ber 17, 1970, written agreement (Exhibit P . 25), was 
the result and culmination of any and all negotiations 
between the parties which took place in August, 1970. 
Any negotiations by and between the parties which 
resulted in that certain written agreement, Exhibit 25, 
are inadmissible as evidence and the admissibility there-
of is reversible error; all subsequent oral negotiations 
varying the terms of the written agreement cannot be 
held to modify the written agreement unless the mod-
ification was in writing. 
In view of the lower court's findings one must 
assume that it found that a new ageement was made 
between plaintiff and defendant modifying the terms 
of the written contract. But, to be effective, 
"as a modification, the new agreement must 
possess all the elements necessary to form a con-
tract. A modification of a contract requires the 
assent of both, or all, parties to the contract. 
Mutual assent is as much a requisite element in 
effecting a contractual modification as it is in the 
initial creation of a contract. 17 Am. Jur. 2d 
935. 
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In examining all the minutes of the city council 
admitted into evidence it is clear that there was no 
mutual assent by the city's governing body to modify 
the terms of the November 17, 1970, written agreement. 
I t is further stated that 
The mental purpose of one of the parties to a 
contract [plaintiff] cannot change its terms, nor 
are indefinite expressions sufficient to establish a 
binding agreement to change the formal require-
ments of a written contract . . . Mere negotia-
tions between parties will not suffice to produce 
a modification. Before that result can be accom-
plished, the negotiations must ripen into a mutual 
valid, and enforceable agreement to modify the 
old contract. 17 Am. Jur. 2d 935. 
Regarding Finding No. 8 of the lower court the 
only part which is sustained by the evidence is that 
which relates to the fact that the "minutes were kept 
as the official records of the city in the offices of the 
City of West Jordan under the care, custody and con-
trol of the City Recorder of the defendant, and said 
minutes became the official records of the resolutions, 
ordinances and other actions . . . undertaken by the 
City of West Jordan." As to that finding the defend-
ant stipulated and it now admits before this court. The 
balance of finding No. 8 could not possibly be sup-
ported by the evidence in the record and additionally 
by the fact that there were written agreements entered 
into by the city (Exhibit 25) and that the city did not 
rely upon the minutes of its council for its contractual 
obligations. 
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The finding of the lower court that "the pay-back 
agreement is specifically set forth in writing in the 
various official Minutes of the City Council and was 
approved by unanimous vote of said Council" (Finding 
No. 11) is not supported and cannot be sustained by 
the evidence. Nowhere in all the minutes of the council 
which were introduced into evidence does it show that a 
vote let alone a unanimous vote was taken setting 
forth a payback agreement. The minutes of the coun-
cil discussed a possible payback agreement the terms 
of which are not fully known to anyone including the 
plaintiff itself. 
The remaining of the court's finding No. 11 is 
totally inconsistent and contrary to the lower court's 
decision in that said finding is based upon a theory of 
unjust enrichment and/or quantum mermit, a cause of 
action sued upon by the plaintiff, but appeared to have 
been dismissed by the lower court in its memorandum 
decision to allow plaintiff to be entitled to this First 
Cause of Action as prayed. 
The finding in Findings No. 11 that the city re-
ceived the benefits "accruing from the construction of 
said line is totally inapposite of the facts as taken by 
judicial notice of the lower court as it is shown from 
the following colloquy between counsel for plaintiff and 
defendant and the court. 
MR. P R A T T : We are not seeking unjust en-
richment for all the taxes you collected or any-
thing like that. We built you a sewer line that 
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you are not — you now own, use and receive ben-
efits from. 
MR. C O L E S S I D E S : Right. That's exactly 
the point. We receive benefit from it. What 
are the benefits? His testimony showed it was 
the monthly — Mrs. Anderson testified that we 
received three dollars and twenty-five cents every 
month. 
T H E COURT: Well, now, I can see your 
point but I am not sure that that — oh, I am 
sure they spend every penny of it running the 
treatment plant and keeping the line serviced 
and — 
MR. C O L E S S I D E S : That's exactly the evi-
dence I want to have before the Court, Your 
Honor, unless the Court — 
T H E COURT: I'll take judicial notice of that. 
MR. COLESSIDES: Unless the Court wishes 
to take judicial notice which is fine. 
T H E COURT: I don't think any of them make 
any money. 
(Tr. p. 106 line 1 to line 18.) 
Plaintiff's First Cause of Action upon which the 
lower court gave judgment is strictly a cause of action 
based on a contractual theory and does not contemplate 
the receiving of a benefit by the city, or the increased 
valuation of the City's essets, nor the added real prop-
erty tax values. These findings are totally inconsistent 
with the judgment of the lower court, they are not sup-
ported or sustained by the evidence in the record and 
therefore are erroneous. 
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The lower court erred in its finding No. 10, to the 
effect that the city through the collection of the monthly 
service charges from the 167 connections ". . . has ob-
tained adequate and legal financing for the payment 
of said construction costs, and that in addition thereto 
the city has other finances available for the payment 
of said sewer construction costs. There simply does 
not exist any evidence in the record tending to prove 
any of the above or to sustain and support the same. 
The lower court not only varied the terms of the 
agreement by the parties as represented by Exhibit 25, 
but in addition, it created a new contract between the 
parties by sheer judicial force. 
In conclusion defendant submits that the lower 
court's judgment should be reversed and vacated on 
the basis and for the reason that the court erred in 
modifying the existing written contract and creating 
a new one by interpreting oral evidence which should 
have been stricken from the record. 
P O I N T I I I 
T H E E V I D E N C E P R E S E N T E D F A I L S 
TO E S T A B L I S H T H A T T H E R E W A S A CON-
T R A C T B E T W E E N P L A I N T I F F A N D D E -
F E N D A N T . 
The lower court erred in finding that there was a 
valid and enforceable contract between plaintiff and 
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the municipal corporation because the evidence when 
viewed in their totality cannot sustain such a finding. 
There is no question that the City of West Jordan 
has a right given by the Utah State Legislature to 
enter into contracts the same as any other corporation. 
The right to contract is given by Section 10-7-1 where-
in it states that 
Cities and towns shall be bodies politic and cor-
porate with perpetual succession. They . . . 
may . . . make contracts . . . for corporate 
purposes. Section 10-7-1, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953). 
The legislature did not set any specific guidelines 
as to how contracts in general by the municipality may 
be entered into and gave the power to the city to devise 
the method and mode of entering into contract by 
enacting Section 10-7-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
whereby the governing body by ordinance may choose 
to exercise its power to contract. 
In the instant case the City of West Jordan did 
not enact any ordinance to describe methods of con-
tracting, so one must look either to other stautory pro-
visions enacted by the Utah State Legislature applic-
able to municipal contracts (see Point I) or other 
existing law relating to the formation of contracts. 
Generally, the requirements for the formation of 
a contract are that there must be "sufficient consider-
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ation, clear and explicit words to express the agree-
ment, and the assent of both contracting parties." 17 
Am. Jur. 2d 345. In light of the above stated criteria 
we must examine the evidence in the record and deter-
mine whether or not there was agreement. 
Other than plaintiff's counsel's own assertions that 
the City of West Jordan through the collection of $3.50 
monthly sewer fee obtained the necessary legal financing 
the record is void of any evidence supporting said con-
tention. To the contrary the record is replete with 
testimony by plaintiff's witnesses that without a sewer 
plaintiff could not obtain financing from F H A to de-
velop the subdivisions. Mr. Coates, who was one of the 
originators of this development testified as follows: 
Q. Isn't it true that the reason you wanted to 
have the sewer in this subdivision is because 
F.H.A. would not finance unsewered subdivi-
sions ? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And the reason you put the subdivision — 
you put the — the line from this point to this 
point was to develop a subdivision? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Otherwise, F.H.A. would not give you the 
money? 
A. That's correct. 
(Tr. p. 26, lines 12 to 21). 
And later on, plaintiff's General Manager, Mr. 
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Green testified as follows: 
Q. Well, let mje ask you this: Isn't it true that 
F.H.A. required you to sewer this subdivision in 
order for them to finance it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Otherwise they wouldn't have financed it 
would they? 
:/•:.•• A . N o . 
Q. Without this sewer line they — without the 
sewer they would not finance it would they? 
A. No. 
Q. No, they would not. Now, let me ask you 
another question. Isn't it true that with the 
sewer line that property [34 acres] was improved 
in value. 
A. Yes. This is true. 
(Tr. p. 71, lines 11 to 23). 
The only inferrence which can be made from the 
above testimony is that the municipality did not receive 
any consideration for the installation of the sewer line 
and that the sewer line aided and assisted the financing 
of the development and helped the plaintiff reap its 
profits. 
The other requirements necessary for the forma-
tion of contract are "clear and explicit words to ex-
press the agreement" and mutual assent. We have 
searched the record for such clear and explicit words 
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but we find none. The council in its public delibera-
tions, as shown by the evidence of the minutes, is dis-
cussing a payback agreement as early as August 4, 
1970, in reviewing a proposal by Mr. Coates. After 
the presentation of the proposal by Mr. Coates "the 
council decided to meet later tonight and go over the 
sample agreement and consider the water and sewer 
line extensions" (emphasis added; Exhibit P-4). At 
that time plaintiff was proposing a payback of $2.00 
per connection, per month for a total pay out over a 
period of 5 years (Exhibit P-4). From that point on 
plaintiff was unable to show that a public meeting sub-
sequent to that of August 4, 1970, the council agreed 
to a payback of $1.50 per connection, per month for 
a total pay out over a period of 7 years. In addition, 
the record does not disclose the time when said pay-
ments will begin and how said payments are to be made 
that is whether they are going to be paid in monthly, 
quarterly, semi-annual or annual payments. 
From the evidence and in light of the various 
amounts and the duration of time, discussed by the 
council and plaintiff's representatives, it appears that 
the parties did not arrive at a meeting of the minds so 
as to from a binding contract. 
I t is respectfully urged upon this court that be-
cause the agreement complained of lacked the necessary 
consideration, was vague and indefinite as to repayment 
terms and lacked the mutual assent necessary, it is 
invalid and unenforceable. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant submits that the case at bar represents 
the classic case of the validity of a municipal contract 
where justice must achieve the ultimate balance in 
protecting the interests of the inhabitants of a municip-
ality versus those who deal with a city and must be 
aware of all the statutory requirements relating to 
contracting with a city. 
Above all this court should protect the residents of 
the municipality because their interest is paramount to 
the interest of a private party and therefore this Court 
must issue its mandate to reverse the judgment of the 
lower court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
N E M E L K A & C O L E S S I D E S 
NICK J . C O L E S S I D E S 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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Served three (3) copies of the foregoing brief to 
Elliott Lee Pratt, attorney for plaintiff-respondent, 
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by mailing the same, postage prepaid, this 10th day 
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